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Note
AGENCY DISCRETION AND STATUTORY MANDATES IN
A TIME OF INADEQUATE FUNDING: AN ALTERNATIVE
TO IN RE AIKEN COUNTY
BRET KUPFER
When an agency fails to abide by a statutory mandate, aggrieved
parties may petition the courts for an order compelling the agency to act.
In the interest of Congress’s constitutional power, courts will grant the
petition and force agencies to comply. However, it is unclear whether an
agency violates a statutory mandate when Congress intentionally
withholds adequate funds to comply with the mandate.
On August 13, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ordered the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
to spend $11.1 million in carryover appropriations to review an
application for a nuclear waste repository in Yucca Mountain. Congress
has not provided additional funding in the last three years, and the $11.1
million is grossly inadequate to complete the statutory mandate. The order
will produce no measurable benefit to the petitioners or the public, and the
waste of funding is an absurd result that Congress never intended. A
review of decisions across other circuits shows a split on whether a writ of
mandamus is always appropriate when an agency fails to meet a statutory
mandate. Conjoining the factors considered in those opinions, this Note
lays out an alternative to forcing agencies to act when there is near
certainty the action will not expedite relief for the claimant due to a lack of
future appropriations.
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AGENCY DISCRETION AND STATUTORY MANDATES IN
A TIME OF INADEQUATE FUNDING: AN ALTERNATIVE
TO IN RE AIKEN COUNTY
BRET KUPFER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress’s failure to pass appropriation bills in a timely manner
undermines the effectiveness and efficiency of government. It has been
more than a decade since Congress passed all twelve of the regular
appropriation bills before the start of the fiscal year (FY).1 With increasing
frequency, the House and Senate pass lump-sum omnibus bills that limit
debate and the opportunity for members to make amendments.2 Funding
*
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; SUNY New Paltz, magna cum
laude, B.A. 2005. I would like to thank Professor Richard Parker for his thoughtful feedback during
the drafting of this Note. In addition, I owe many thanks to the members of the Connecticut Law
Review for their hard work and collegial support. As a matter of disclosure, I worked at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for one summer. My responsibilities were not related to any of the matters
mentioned in this Note. Aside from the sources cited, all legal analysis, arguments, and suggestions of
policy are mine alone.
1
The fiscal year begins October 1 before the corresponding calendar year and ends September 30.
2 U.S.C. § 631 (2012). When an impasse occurs, threatening a shutdown of the government, Congress
passes a “continuing resolution” which extends a proportional amount of funds for each agency’s
appropriation respective to the amount appropriated in the previous year for the time period determined
in the continuing resolution. For example, if an agency was appropriated $12 billion for FY 1, and
Congress passed a two-month continuing resolution from October 1 to December 1 for FY 2, then the
agency is instructed to operate on a $2 billion budget for two months without knowing how much will
be provided in the last ten months of the fiscal year. To prevent government shutdowns, Congress has
passed at least one continuing resolution each year for the past decade. E.g., Continuing
Appropriations Resolution, 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-175, 126 Stat. 1313 (2012); Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-33, 125 Stat. 363 (2011); Continuing Appropriations Act,
2011, Pub. L. No. 111-242, 124 Stat. 2607 (2010); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-68, div. B, 123 Stat. 2023, 2043–53 (2009); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2009,
Pub. L. No. 110-329, div. A, 122 Stat. 3574, 3574–84 (2008); Continuing Appropriations Resolution,
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-92, 121 Stat. 989 (2007); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-289, 120 Stat. 1257, 1311–16 (2006); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-77, 119 Stat. 2037 (2005); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-309,
118 Stat. 1137 (2004); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-84, 117 Stat.
1042 (2003). The government shutdown that ensued as this Note went to publication further
emphasizes the inability to pass appropriation bills before the start of the fiscal year.
2
For example, for FY 2013 the full Senate failed to consider separately several bills reported
from committee. S. 3301, 112th Cong. (as passed by S. Comm. on Appropriations, June 14, 2012);
S. 3216, 112th Cong. (as passed by S. Comm. on Appropriations, May 22, 2012); S. 2465, 112th Cong.
(as passed S. Comm. on Appropriations, Apr. 26, 2012); S. 2375, 112th Cong. (as passed by S. Comm.
on Appropriations, Apr. 26, 2012); S. 2323, 112th Cong. (as passed by S. Comm. on Appropriations,
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levels for authorized programs are not receiving the consideration they
deserve, and federal agencies are increasingly tasked with implementing
our federal laws without knowing what resources they may rely upon to
perform a sufficient job. Nonetheless, Congress will continue to pass
authorizations that span multiple years while failing to provide funding in
each subsequent year. Agencies are without guidance as to whether they
can cut or ignore underfunded statutory mandates.
Congress’s failure to consider funding levels of specific programs not
only creates problems for an agency that does not know how to proceed,
but also for the courts that provide judicial review of the agency’s action.
Federal rulemaking, adjudications, and informal decision making is
plagued with delays that are created in part by Congress’s failure to
provide funding. These delays impact individuals in countless ways.
Veterans are not receiving their benefits on time, innovators are deterred
from investing in patents, and drug manufacturers are stalled when trying
to bring potentially life-saving medication to market.3
We have a problem posed by agencies that delay congressional
mandates for years or miss deadlines, but the courts have not crafted a
clear doctrine on how delays should be remedied. The Supreme Court has
never addressed the issue, the circuit courts have been split for ten years,
and the lower courts are in need of guidance. The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)4 states that a court “shall compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,”5 and some courts and
scholars interpret this to mean that a court must issue a writ of mandamus
when an agency misses a statutory deadline. Of the scholarly pieces
offering suggestions on the matter, only a few comment on whether an
agency with inadequate funding must always abide by a statutory deadline.
This Note examines how an agency’s obligation to perform an
underfunded mandate and its discretion to allocate its own resources were
weighed against each other in an August 13, 2013, decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit—In re Aiken
County.6 Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to force the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to review the Department of Energy’s
Apr. 19, 2012). For FY 2011, a majority of appropriation bills were not enacted as Congress passed
continuing resolutions extending to FY 2012. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, div. B, 125 Stat. 38, 102 (2011).
3
See, e.g., James D. Ridgway, Equitable Power in the Time of Budget Austerity: The Problem of
Judicial Remedies for Unconstitutional Delays in Claims Processing by Federal Agencies, 64 ADMIN.
L. REV. 57, 66, 70 (2012) (noting that the average processing of an appeal to the Social Security
Administration increased from 274 days in 2000 to 481 days by 2006, the length of time to process a
patent was 35 months in 2010, and the average time for a veteran to dispute a decision by the Board of
Veterans’ Appeals was 3.9 years).
4
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012).
5
Id. § 706(1).
6
725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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(DOE’s) application for a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in
Nevada.7 Although the NRC failed to act within the statutory deadline
established by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA),8 the agency argued
that its delay was lawful because the remaining $11.1 million appropriated
to review the application for Yucca is inadequate to finish the review and
Congress will not provide additional funds in the foreseeable future.9
Petitioners argued that the NRC is statutorily required to use all available
funds until the mandate is achieved.10 The court ordered the agency to
spend the $11.1 million, despite the likelihood that doing so would not
provide any relief for the petitioner.11 This Note takes the position that
even when an agency misses a congressionally imposed deadline, the
agency action is not unreasonably delayed when it is near certain a court
order requiring the agency to act will not expedite relief for the claimant
due to a lack of future appropriations.
Part II of this Note provides the factual story of nuclear waste in
America, and provides context for the financial, political, and legal issues
that led the NRC to toll its review of the application for a repository in
Yucca Mountain. Part III introduces the reader to judicial review of
agency decisions, and considers cases where deadlines, inadequate
appropriations, and absurd effects of a statute factored into the court’s
decision on whether the agency had discretion to not implement a law. In
Part IV, I propose a new rule and a set of factors to guide courts in
deciding whether to order an agency to act upon a statutory mandate when
the agency does not have the adequate funds to comply.
II. BACKGROUND ON YUCCA AND THE LITIGATION
A. History of Nuclear Waste
The NRC’s duty to review the DOE’s application for a permanent
nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain is the most recent legal fight
arising from the decision of policy makers to utilize nuclear energy. The
history of nuclear energy is in large part a creation of government policy.
Government decisions have been responsible for the Manhattan Project,
the nuclear navy, and the fact that one-fifth of our electricity is generated
by nuclear energy.12 Today, government support includes billions of
dollars in government loan guarantees for investors in new nuclear plants
7

Id. at 258.
Pub. L. No. 97-425, §114(d), 96 Stat. 2201, 2215 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
10101–10270 (2006)).
9
Final Brief for the Respondents at 44–45, In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255 (No. 11-1271).
10
Reply Brief of Petitioner at 21, In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255 (No. 11-1271).
11
In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d at 259.
12
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/NE-0139, NUCLEAR ENERGY —DEPEND ON IT 1 (2011).
8
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as well as the continued promise made in the Price-Anderson Act of 195713
to limit the liability of any nuclear operator for an accident committed by a
private or public actor.14
Currently, sixty-two operating nuclear plants15 and eleven
decommissioned nuclear plants16 store spent nuclear fuel (SNF), which is a
byproduct from electricity generation.17 The DOE maintains a handful of
sites that store SNF and high-level radioactive waste that are the byproduct
of research, nuclear weapon reactors, and navy ship reactors.18 Both
proponents of nuclear energy and their environmental critics agree that the
nation needs a permanent solution to dispose of SNF and high-level
radioactive waste.19 The question of where to put nuclear waste has been
discussed since World War II.20 The majority of the nation’s SNF is kept
in cooling pools on-site at the reactors, where it awaits an answer to the
problem.21 The alternative to keeping fuel rods in the cooling pools is
placing them in dry casks. All decommissioned nuclear plants that no
longer produce electricity have been forced to seal their fuel rods in these
casks made of metal and cement that stand up to twenty feet tall.22 Nuclear
13

Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006)).
Megan Easley, Note, Standing in Nuclear Waste: Challenging the Disposal of Yucca Mountain,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 664 (2012).
15
See NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, NUREG-1350, INFORMATION DIGEST 2013–2014
app. A (2013) (providing the latest list of operating nuclear reactors).
16
BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
36 (2012).
17
When electricity is produced from nuclear energy, unstable uranium rods are used to boil water
in a reactor that creates the steam that turns the electric turbine. Scott R. Helton, Comment, The Legal
Problems of Spent Nuclear Fuel Disposal, 23 ENERGY L.J. 179, 180 (2002). When the rods lose too
much energy and can no longer be used to generate electricity they are placed in cooling pools because
they still maintain enough radioactivity to cause a meltdown if not properly managed. Id. The terms
“spent nuclear fuel,” “SNF,” “spent fuel rods,” “high-level radioactive waste,” and “nuclear waste”
pose the same threats and challenges and may be used interchangeably in this Note.
18
BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16, at 17–18.
19
See, e.g., Marvin Fertel, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Nuclear Energy Inst., State of the
Industry at the 2013 Nuclear Energy Assembly (May 14, 2013), available at http://www.nei.org/NewsMedia/Speeches/Marvin-Fertel,-President-and-CEO,-Nuclear-Energy-I (advocating for a review of the
license application for Yucca Mountain and the necessary legislation to renew a commitment to fuel
disposal); Adam Russell, Federal Court Ruling Means Yucca Mountain Project Is Dead, According to
Friends of the Earth, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.foe.org/news/archives/201308-fed-court-ruling-means-yucca-mountain-project-is-dead (“There should be a real national
conversation about how to move forward with the selection of a repository site for the deadly waste
generated by nuclear power . . . .”).
20
Tom Kenny, Note, Where to Put It All? Opening the Judicial Road for a Long-Term Solution to
the Nation’s Nuclear Waste Problem, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1319, 1320 (2011).
21
BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16, at 14.
22
See id. at 16, 34 (discussing dry storage practices and noting that casks have walls up to three
feet thick and weigh up to 360,000 pounds); Cate Lecuyer, Yankee Gets OK for Dry Cask Storage,
REFORMER.COM (Apr. 27, 2006), http://www.reformer.com/headlines/ci_3756755 (reporting licensing
approval of twenty foot tall dry casks at the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant); Dry Cask Storage
Project Underway at Fermi 2, DTE ENERGY, http://www.dteenergy.com/nuclear/dryCaskStorageProje
14
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plants in operation today have placed some of their spent fuel rods into dry
casks, but due to the additional cost, lack of guidance, and unknown future
regulations of waste management, they have chosen to keep the majority of
spent fuel rods in the cooling pools.23
Both methods of temporary storage require licensing approval by the
NRC, the agency tasked with ensuring safe operating standards of all
civilian nuclear plants.24 If a permanent repository existed today, the NRC
could demand that plant operators take such action necessary to minimize
temporary storage in favor of the permanent solution. Absent a long-term
storage solution, extension after extension has been granted to licensees of
dry casks and cooling pools; these temporary storage solutions are now
holding SNF far beyond the expected timeframe of twenty to thirty years.25
As is true with all things nuclear related, the partial core meltdown at
Three Mile Island in 1979 initiated changes for how nuclear waste is
regulated. Less than two months after the Three Mile Island meltdown, the
D.C. Circuit held that the NRC could not extend the operating license of a
nuclear plant without a plan for handling radioactive waste.26 The NRC
responded to the decision by amending its draft rule on the disposal of
nuclear waste that had been in the works for the previous seven years.27
Still, Congress did not pass meaningful legislation until 1983 when it
passed the NWPA, which directed the DOE to develop a plan, choose a
location, and construct a permanent waste repository for all of the nation’s
high-level radioactive waste by 1998.28

ct.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (making note of the twenty foot tall casks stored at the Enrico Fermi
nuclear power plant).
23
See Spent Fuel Storage in Pools and Dry Casks Key Points and Questions & Answers, U.S.
NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/faqs.html#4 (last updated Mar.
25, 2013) (reporting that as of 2009, 78% of spent nuclear waste was in spent fuel pools and 22% was
in dry casks). In the United States there are 50,000 metric tons of SNF in cooling pools, and 15,000
metric tons in dry casks. BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16, at 10–
11.
24
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b), (h) (2006).
25
See, e.g., Waste Confidence Decision Review, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,790 (Sept. 28, 1989)
(codified as amended at 10 C.F.R. § 51 (2013)) (finding that a delay of repository until 2025 will not
pose a significant risk to public safety or the environment); BD. ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT.,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RETHINKING HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL 8–9 (1990)
(determining that nuclear waste can be safely stored at the reactor sites for at least one hundred years);
BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16, at 34 (explaining how the NRC
amended its Waste Confidence Decision in 2010 to permit extensions of SNF in temporary storage for
up to sixty years).
26
Minnesota v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n., 602 F.2d 412, 416, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
27
Storage and Disposal of Nuclear Waste, 44 Fed. Reg. 61,372, 61,373 (Oct. 25, 1979).
28
Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 97-425, §§ 111, 112, 114, 115, 145, 302(a)(5)(b), 96
Stat. 2201, 2207–2220, 2258 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2006)).
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B. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act: Congress’s Long-Term Plan for Spent
Nuclear Fuel
The NWPA divided the responsibility of establishing the repository
among three separate agencies. The DOE would generate a list of potential
sites for “site characterization”—the process of conducting intensive
geological examination that tests the physical suitability of a site.29 The
EPA would set radiological release standards by determining a safe level
of radioactivity, if any, that might escape from a nuclear repository.30 The
NRC would use the EPA’s standards to determine whether the DOE
characterized sites met public health and safety regulations and whether a
license should be issued.31 If approved, the DOE would be in charge of
construction and maintenance.32
To pay for the development and construction of the repository, the
NWPA authorized the Secretary of Energy to enter contracts with plant
operators and charge a fee on all electricity generated by nuclear reactors.33
Although plant operators are contractually obligated to pay one-tenth of
one cent per kilowatt-hour generated into the Nuclear Waste Fund,34 the
fee is passed on to the consumers. Over nearly thirty years, electricity
customers have contributed $16 billion to the Nuclear Waste Fund,35
which, when accounting for interest, totals $28 billion currently available
to finance a permanent repository.36 In consideration for the fee payments,
the federal government promised plant operators that it would begin
accepting SNF for storage by January 31, 1998.37
The NWPA required the Secretary of Energy to nominate five sites for
a permanent repository, and to take into consideration hydrology,
geophysics, seismic activity, nuclear activity of the military, valuable
natural resources, proximity to water supplies, and the proximity to
populations.38 The Act further requires a full environmental assessment,
and public hearings of each candidate site.39 By 1984, the DOE had
nominated nine candidate sites and produced draft environmental

29

42 U.S.C. §§ 10132, 10133 (2006).
Id. § 10141(a).
31
Id. §§ 10134(d), 10141(b).
32
Id. § 10107(b)(2).
33
Id. § 10156(a)(1)–(3).
34
Id. § 10222(a)(1)–(2).
35
BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16, at 70–71.
36
RICKEY R. HASS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S
NUCLEAR WASTE FUND’S FISCAL YEAR 2012 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 8 (2012).
37
42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5).
38
Id. § 10132(a), (b)(1)(A).
39
Id. § 10132(b)(1)(D), (b)(2).
30
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assessments for each. More than a year behind the statutory deadline, the
DOE narrowed its list for characterization to sites in Texas, Washington,
and Yucca Mountain in Nevada.41
In 1987, Congress intervened in the site selection process and passed
the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act that prohibited characterization
of any site other than Yucca Mountain.42 The process was driven more by
politics and NIMBY’ism43 than science.44 Congressional members from
the eastern states supported passage on the condition that the Act was
amended to scratch the plan for a second repository that would likely be
cited on the opposite side of the country from Yucca. Those from South
Carolina and Tennessee had objections because their states were expected
to host short-term storage facilities, and they feared that their states would
become the de facto permanent repositories if Yucca had serious delays.45
These votes were picked up by amending the legislation to prohibit the
operation of any short-term storage until the permanent repository was
licensed46—a move that proved costly because now the government has no
ability to remove waste from nuclear plants. In the end, the Act had
something for everyone except the people of Nevada.
C. Nominating Yucca and the Litigation Fallout
Congress’s move to limit consideration of repository sites to Yucca
Mountain did not repeal the procedural provisions of the NWPA. The
selection process still required the DOE to perform environmental testing
and solicit concerns from the local community before it could nominate a
site to the President.
The people of Nevada launched every legislative and legal grenade
40
Availability of Draft Environmental Assessments for Proposed Site Nominations and
Announcement of Public Information Meetings and Hearings, 49 Fed. Reg. 49,540 (Dec. 20, 1984).
41
Thomas A. Cotton, Nuclear Waste Story: Setting the Stage, in UNCERTAINTY UNDERGROUND:
YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND THE NATION’S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE 29, 31–32 (Allison M.
Macfarlane & Rodney C. Ewing eds., 2006).
42
Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 5011(a), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-228 (1987) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 10172 (2006)).
43
“NIMBY” stands for “not in my back yard,” and is commonly used to summarize the attitude
of opponents to power plants, garbage dumps, prisons, wind farms, and other utilities that improve the
public welfare but are opposed solely for the proposed location.
44
For example, Congressman Al Swift (D-WA) was upset that Congress would undermine a
process grounded in scientific facts, but was still inclined to vote for the legislation out of fear that the
collective action from other members would limit the location of a repository to Washington if he too
did not act for his own parochial interest. Nevada: Nuclear Waste Site, 1987–1988 Legislative
Chronology, 7 CONGRESS & NATION 483, 487 (1989). The bill’s leading advocate, Chairman J.
Bennett Johnston (D-LA) of the Senate Energy Committee, highlighted the cost benefits of a plan that
tested only one site, and committed the nation pending positive test results because the cost to test the
geological suitability of a site was $1 to $2 billion. Id. at 483.
45
Id. at 484.
46
Id.
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they could to block Congress’s plan to build a permanent repository within
their state.47 State elected officials first passed legislation prohibiting the
designation of Yucca as the repository, which was struck down by the
Ninth Circuit.48 They then argued the DOE environmental impact study
failed to consider the threats of transporting nuclear waste to Yucca.49
Again, the courts refused to allow the state from blocking further
progress.50 Opponents then successfully litigated against the EPA
standards used to conduct an environmental impact study.51 The EPA and
the NRC were forced to adopt standards that could safely store nuclear
waste for one million years instead of the original standard requiring ten
thousand years.52 But this victory for Nevada only delayed the process.
Fifteen years after Congress declared Yucca as the only site for
characterization, the DOE nominated the site to President George W. Bush
in 2002.53 President Bush approved the site within a day, and the
congressional approval required by the NWPA54 was achieved within five
months.55 Six years later, on June 3, 2008, after a $12 billion
characterization, the DOE submitted its license application for Yucca to
the NRC.56 The NWPA provides that the NRC has three years to review
the application,57 which gave it until June 3, 2011, to issue a decision.
Up until 2008, the plan for a nuclear waste repository in Nevada never
suffered from a lack of support in Washington, but Nevada was not going
to give up. Five months after the DOE delivered the application to the
NRC, Barack Obama was elected President. He, along with every
Democratic candidate for President, had promised Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid (D-NV) and the people of Nevada that he would oppose a
permanent nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain.58 As discussed
47

Easley, supra note 14, at 668–69.
Nevada ex rel. Loux v. Herrington, 777 F.2d 529, 536 (9th Cir. 1985).
49
Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
50
Id. at 93–94.
51
See Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding, inter
alia, that the EPA violated the Energy Policy Act when it determined 10,000 years was a long enough
safety standard for the integrity of a nuclear waste repository).
52
Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada,
73 Fed. Reg. 61,256 (Oct. 15, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 197 (2013)).
53
Letter from Spencer Abraham, Sec’y of Energy, to the President of the United States
Recommending the Yucca Mountain Site for a Repository Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
(Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-energy/issues/yuccamountain/letter-to-the-president_salp_ocrwm_doe_gov.pdf.
54
42 U.S.C. § 10134(a)(2)(A), (b) (2006).
55
Joint Resolution of July 23, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-200, 116 Stat. 735.
56
Yucca Mountain; Notice of Receipt and Availability of Application, 73 Fed Reg. 34,348 (June
17, 2008). The application is available at www.nrc.gov/waste/hlw-disposal/yucca-lic-app.html.
57
42 U.S.C. § 10134(d).
58
See Michael J. Mishak & J. Patrick Coolican, Democrats on Yucca Mountain, LAS VEGAS SUN,
http://www.lasvegassun.com/politics/voterguide/2008/democrats/issues/yucca/ (last visited Sept. 23,
48

2013]

AN ALTERNATIVE TO IN RE AIKEN COUNTY

341

below in Part II.E, the President has fully honored his campaign promise.
D. Breaching the Duty to Act by the NWPA Deadline
As the DOE was fighting delays to the site selection process, it was
simultaneously failing to meet its contractual obligations to accept SNF by
the 1998 statutory deadline set by the NWPA. In 1994, the DOE issued a
Notice of Inquiry that it would not accept waste at a repository until 2010
at the earliest, twelve years after the deadline.59 Twenty states and fourteen
plant operators sued the DOE that year in an effort to get the government
on a faster path to a permanent repository.60 Parties filing lawsuits wanted
to get rid of the nuclear waste as soon as possible, and they had a strong
argument that the DOE had a legal obligation to take it away.
In 1995, the D.C. Circuit held that the DOE had an unconditional
statutory obligation to meet the 1998 deadline.61 The DOE responded by
essentially ignoring the court’s opinion, arguing that although it had
breached the contracts, it was permitted to do so given factors out of its
control.62 The matter found its way back before the D.C. Circuit, which
held the government is obligated to pay for damages arising out of
breached contracts.63 When the deadline passed a few months later, the
DOE officially breached all of its contracts made under the NWPA. As of
November 2012, the DOE had paid $2.6 billion resulting from final
judgments and settlements, and it expects to pay an additional $19.7 billion
to resolve the remaining cases—many parties have already won on the
merits and the outstanding issue to be litigated is the amount of damages.64
As the federal government was failing to uphold its side of the
contracts, operators of nuclear plants were approaching the end of their
original permits to hold SNF in the cooling pools. Operators had the
option of applying to the NRC for extensions, which permitted them to
2013) (quoting then-presidential candidate Barack Obama as stating “Yucca is a bad idea”; Hillary
Clinton as stating “I’ve been against Yucca Mountain from the beginning, and I’m working with Harry
Reid to try to starve it to death”; and John Edwards as stating “[nuclear waste] has to be kept and stored
where it’s produced”).
59
Notice of Inquiry: Waste Acceptance Issues, 59 Fed. Reg. 27,007, 27,007–08 (May 25, 1994).
60
Editorial, Forcing a Decision on Nuclear Waste, CHI. TRIB. (July 24, 1994),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-07-24/news/9407240181_1_central-storage-facility-site-atyucca-mountain-nuclear-power.
61
Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
62
See Kenny, supra note 20, at 1328 (noting the DOE’s argument that “technical problems;
regulatory delays; roadblocks to implementation of [an interim facility]; funding restrictions; litigation
delays; and consultation requirements” were all uncontrollable by the DOE and that the contracts
permitted such force majeure-like defenses (alteration in original) (quoting N. States Power Co. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Energy, 128 F.3d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1997))).
63
N. States Power Co., 128 F.3d at 760–61.
64
HASS, supra note 36, at 19–20. The nuclear industry estimates actual total damages will exceed
$50 billion. Id. at 20.
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store increasing amounts of spent fuel rods in the cooling pools, or for
permission to transfer the fuel rods to steel-lined cement dry casks.65
Even if the NRC had extended licenses to store SNF at nuclear plants
indefinitely, the plant operators would still be in position to sue the DOE
for breaching the contractual deadline given the costs of indefinitely
holding SNF. Extended licenses have costs associated with expanding onsite dry cask storage, fitting more spent fuel rods into cooling pools, relicensing these activities, and the liabilities that come with holding spent
fuel.66 As these costs add up, the financial fallout from the DOE’s breach
will cost taxpayers billions of dollars. The DOE has entered seventy-two
contracts to accept SNF and high-level radioactive waste, and the damages
and liabilities are estimated to cost taxpayers $500 million each year in
settlement and damages until a permanent solution is available.67 Through
2011, seventy-eight claims had been filed against the DOE.68 If planning
and construction of the repository were to move forward immediately
without further delays, total damages at the time of expected completion in
2020 would be $20.8 billion.69 But that is an unrealistic expectation given
the political environment, and that the DOE has most recently established a
goal of opening interim storage facilities that could accept the waste by
2025.70
E. Funding for Nuclear Waste Management
The Obama Administration has taken many steps to block the NRC
from approving the DOE application for Yucca. The President appointed
Senator Reid’s former staffer to head the NRC;71 had the DOE withdraw
the application, only to have such action held to be in violation of the
NWPA;72 and established a Blue Ribbon Commission to review alternative
solutions to the nation’s nuclear waste problem.73 As discussed below, the
President did one more thing to block Yucca: he coordinated with
Congress to stop funding the review of the DOE application.
65

See Kenny, supra note 20, at 1321–22.
See, e.g., S. Cal. Edison Co. v. United States, 655 F.3d 1319, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(holding that a nuclear plant operator was entitled to such indirect overhead costs as “plant security,
emergency response systems, lease payments, regulatory fees . . . [and] salaries” in addition to the
direct costs associated with building dry cask storage).
67
BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16, at 80.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
DEP’T OF ENERGY, STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL
AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 2 (2013).
71
Obama Picks Nuclear Panel Leader, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 14, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/us/politics/14brfs-OBAMAPICKSNU_BRF.html?_r=0.
72
U.S. Dep’t of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), 71 N.R.C. 609, 629 (2010).
73
President Barack Obama, Memorandum on the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s
Nuclear Future, 75 Fed. Reg. 5485 (Feb. 3, 2010).
66
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Projects spanning multiple appropriation cycles often fall victim to
changing congressional priorities and the inability of participants to know
what financing will be provided from year to year. Government agencies
suffer from the inability to retain specialists, schedule projects in the most
efficient order, or sign longer-term contracts with vendors that would
provide more service for the same amount of taxpayer dollars. Proponents
of the NWPA hoped to overcome these obstacles by creating the selfsustaining Nuclear Waste Fund. Although the fund holds over $28
billion,74 the NWPA requires Congress to first appropriate money from the
fund to agencies before they may make expenditures.75 Thus, today
Congress could provide the NRC and the DOE with all the necessary
funding to complete a repository without increasing taxes, increaseing the
national debt, or shifting funds away from other programs.
It is hard to know exactly how much the NRC will need to complete its
review of the DOE application for Yucca. The best cost estimate for a
program can usually be found in the latest budget request by the NRC to
the Office of Management and Budget.76 However, since 2010 the annual
budget requests have reflected the political objective of the Administration
to stop Yucca.77 In 2009, before political influences prevented the NRC
from preparing a full faith review of the DOE application, the agency
estimated it would need $99.1 million for the coming year.78 Congress
appropriated $29 million for FY 2010 and $10 million for FY 2011.79
NRC’s funding request was reduced to zero dollars for FYs 2012 and
2013, as reflected by White House policy.80 With no surprise, Congress
appropriated zero dollars in each year.81 Today the NRC has only $11.1
million in carryover funds to conduct its review of the DOE application.82
Not surprisingly, the nuclear industry is outraged that the Waste Fund’s
collection of fees continues while the process of building a repository has
74

HASS, supra note 36, at 8.
42 U.S.C. § 10222(e)(2) (2006).
76
Before the President delivers his budget to Congress, government agencies report their requests
for the next fiscal year to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 31 U.S.C. § 1108 (2006). It
is OMB policy not to publicize the initial budget requests submitted by agencies. See OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-11, § 22 (2013). However, the
NRC’s requests for FY 2010, FY 2011, and FY 2012 were discussed in the Inspector General’s report
made public by earlier litigation. See Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 18 n.14.
77
See Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 44–45 (noting that available funding for
the NRC’s review process is far below the estimated $99.1 million annual appropriation necessary for
an adequate review of the DOE application).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 18–20.
80
See supra note 58 and text accompanying notes 71–73.
81
See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 127
Stat. 198 (funding all programs not mentioned in the bill at FY 2012 levels); see also Final Brief for the
Respondents, supra note 9, at 21 (noting funds for FY 2012 were zero).
82
In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
75
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completely broken down.
The DOE, which the government argues is a necessary participant in
NRC’s review of the application, has also seen its funding for Yucca
zeroed out in appropriations. There are 288 outstanding contentions that
the DOE must answer and defend as part of its responsibility to litigate its
application.84 As the applicant, the DOE bears the burden of appearing
before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), an independent
trial-level adjudicatory body within the NRC, and responding to any
contention from a party with standing.85 Congress appropriated $390
million total to the DOE for FY 2008,86 which has steadily declined to
$288 million for FY 2009, $197 million for FY 2010,87 $10 million for
FY2011, $0 for FY 2012,88 and $0 for FY 2013.89
Although the final appropriation bills coming out of Congress in recent
years have prevented further action on the application, many congressional
members still support Yucca. The House passed an appropriation bill in
the summer of 2011 that provided $25 million to the NRC to review
Yucca.90 The bill explicitly forbade the use of any appropriated funds “to
conduct closure of adjudicatory functions, technical review, or support
activities associated with the Yucca Mountain geologic repository license
application . . . or for actions that irrevocably remove the possibility that
Yucca Mountain may be a repository option in the future.”91 The funding
and language in the House version of the bill did not survive the
conference committee.92

83

BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16, at 74.
Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 27.
85
10 C.F.R. § 2.325 (2013).
86
Pub. L. No. 110-161, tit. 3, 121 Stat. 1844, 1960, 1964 (2007) (appropriating $189 million from
the Waste Fund, and $201 million from the general fund).
87
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 71
(2010), available at http:// www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy11/pdf/budget.pdf.
88
Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 20–22.
89
See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 127
Stat. 198 (funding all programs not mentioned in the bill at FY 2012 levels).
90
H.R. 2354, 112th Cong., tit. 3 (as passed by House, July 15, 2011). The Energy and Water
Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act is one of twelve annual appropriation bills, and
encompasses funding for hundreds of programs. SANDY STREETER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700,
THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION 2 (2007). Passage of the bill in
the House does not suggest that a majority of House members support the quoted language on Yucca; it
suggests that there is enough influence in the majority to support such language. Whether a majority of
House members support a permanent repository at Yucca cannot be ascertained by up-or-down votes
on appropriation packages.
91
H.R. 2354, 112th Cong., § 604.
92
Compare id. (appropriating $25 million for the NRC’s review of the DOE application for FY
2012), with Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786 (making no
appropriations or policy reference to Yucca in the final FY 2012 appropriation package passed by
Congress).
84
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F. The NRC’s Refusal to Act on the DOE Application
NRC has missed its statutory three-year deadline of June 3, 2011, and
does not plan to review the DOE application unless adequate funding is
provided. It is undisputed that $11.1 million is inadequate to complete an
assessment of the DOE application, but there are other political
considerations at play as well. In 2010, the Obama Administration had the
DOE withdraw its 2008 application.93 The ASLB held that the withdrawal
violated the NWPA.94 The five commissioners of the NRC can reverse the
ASLB, but they never made a ruling after the ASLB decision.95 In
unorthodox fashion, Gregory Jaczko—Chairman at the time and a former
staffer of Senator Reid96—held the five commissioner’s review of the
ASLB decision open indefinitely because he did not have the votes to
reverse its decision.97 Instead, Jaczko ordered a closure of the review
process, and the petitioners alleged it was an illegal action that shut down
the licensing process before Congress was able to eliminate funding to the
DOE and the NRC.98 The Office of the Inspector General issued a report
finding that Jaczko misled the other Commissioners of his intentions and
delayed the Commissions action, but that he did not violate any laws.99
In response to the Administration’s continuous obstruction of Yucca
Mountain, a coalition of industry stakeholders and municipalities initiated
more litigation to force the government to abide by its statutory mandate.
On July 29, 2011, Aiken County, South Carolina, along with other
municipalities, states, individuals, and energy trade groups filed suit
against the NRC seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the NRC to resume
its review of Yucca Mountain using the funds it has left.100 The $11.1
million remaining funds makes for an interesting set of facts—if the NRC
had already expended all its appropriated dollars, the petitioners in In re
Aiken County would not be asking for a writ of mandamus compelling
NRC to act, although many would still be in position to seek damages. If
the NRC had more remaining funds, say perhaps an amount closer to the
$99.1 million number it requested for FY 2010, the NRC could not have
argued that it should be permitted to disregard a statutory mandate due to
inadequate funds.
On August 3, 2012, the D.C. Circuit ordered the case to be held in
93

Kimberly A. Strassel, Nuclear Politics, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2011, at A13.
U.S. Dep’t of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), 71 N.R.C. 609, 629 (2010).
95
Strassel, supra note 93.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Reply Brief of Petitioners, supra note 10, at 11–12.
99
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OIG CASE NO. 11-05, NRC CHAIRMAN’S UNILATERAL
DECISION TO TERMINATE NRC’S REVIEW OF DOE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY LICENSE
APPLICATION 44–46 (2011).
100
Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 28, In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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abeyance to give Congress time to resolve the inconsistency between the
mandate and appropriations law.101 After Congress failed to address the
issue, the court had to answer whether the NRC was wrong to violate a
statutory mandate when the available funds were inadequate to complete
the mandate.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS
A. Issuing a Writ of Mandamus
Courts have historically issued writs of mandamus and injunctions to
compel agencies to act when they unreasonably delay or disregard
statutory mandates.102 Congress confirmed this authority of the courts and
used it as a basis for constructing judicial review of agency actions when it
passed the APA.103 The APA directs courts to “compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”104 A writ of mandamus is
not without its limitations; a court has no authority to demand that
Congress provide an agency with additional funds to meet a statutory
mandate or that agencies use resources in a more efficient manner.105 A
writ of mandamus is also not a substitute for the tools that courts may use
to force unwilling government institutions to resolve infringements of
constitutional rights, such as school desegregation or prison conditions.106
A court will not issue a writ of mandamus for every act that violates a

101
In re Aiken Cnty., No. 11-1271, 2012 WL 3140360, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2012)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
102
See e.g., Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591–92 (1926) (affirming an injunction that
prohibited the Illinois Commerce Commission from delaying its review of telephone rate increases);
Interstate Commerce Comm’n. v. United States ex rel. Humboldt S.S. Co., 224 U.S. 474, 485 (1912)
(affirming a writ of mandamus to compel action by the ICC).
103
See generally Carol R. Miaskoff, Note, Judicial Review of Agency Delay and Inaction Under
Section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 635, 636–42 (1987)
(reviewing the legislative history of § 706(1) of the APA).
104
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). The legislative history shows that § 706(1) was based on the writ of
mandamus and the All Writs Act. Miaskoff, supra note 103, at 640.
105
In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
106
The authority of federal courts to force the hand of unwilling state and local governments
expanded with Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955), but
remains weak and dependent on the willingness of a government institution to obey a court order.
When government inaction demands court intervention, the courts take a quasi-executive enforcement
role. They may hold officials in contempt, order third parties to sequester funds, appoint a receiver to
administrator school boards, or dissolve institutions. Ridgway, supra note 3, at 101–02. The necessary
actions by states to address desegregation or prison overcrowding are costly endeavors, but cost and
resource limitations are never an excuse. Id. at 97. The Supreme Court even held that a court might
prohibit a municipality’s tax and spending measures. Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233
(1964). Such options available to force government action that stop the infringement of constitutional
rights are not available for agency delay of a statutory mandate.
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statute. The writ is preserved for “extraordinary circumstances,” when
the agency has a “clear duty to act” and the petitioner has a “clear right to
relief.”108 Because a mandamus is an equitable remedy, courts consider
practical considerations such as “timing, resources, and efficacy.”109
B. Agency Delay in the Face of a Statutory Mandate
Courts extend considerable deference to agency decisions.110 Unless
otherwise stipulated in the authorizing statute, an agency decision is
reviewable under sections 701 to 706 of the APA.111 Section 701(a)(2)
exempts agency actions from judicial review that are “committed to agency
discretion by law.”112 The Supreme Court held in Lincoln v. Vigil113 that
there is no judicial review of how an agency spends its appropriated dollars
when such action is committed to agency discretion by law.114 The Indian
Health Service, an agency within the Department of Health and Human
Services, had been operating a pilot health care program for children in the
Southwest under legislation authorizing a nation wide program.115
Congress funded the program with the intention that such funds would be
used to serve populations only in the Southwest pilot, but it never readdressed the authorizing legislation that had a national scope.116
Recipients of health care in the Southwest who lost services when the
Indian Health Service began stretching the funds on a nationwide program
brought suit.117 The Court held that such action was not subject to judicial
review because such action was “committed to agency discretion by
107
Fornaro v. James, 416 F.3d 63, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v Daiflon,
Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980)).
108
Id. (quoting Power v. Barnhart, , 292 F.3d 781, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
109
In re Aiken Cnty., No. 11-1271, 2012 WL 3140360, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2012)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
110
Agency discretion can be viewed as being extended by courts, or it can be viewed as an
extension of legislative authority provided by Congress—the two viewpoints do not conflict. For
example, when Congress passed the Clean Air Act, it directed the EPA to determine air standards that
“allow[] an adequate margin of safety . . . to protect the public health.” 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006).
This open standard gave the EPA considerable discretion to determine what volume of a particular
pollutant in the air crosses the threshold of harming the public health; and the EPA need not consider
the economic implications of the standards it decides. When challenged, the Supreme Court held that
Congress can delegate its authority to agencies. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457,
474–75 (2001). Agencies have unreviewable enforcement discretion unless the statute tailors the
agency’s discretion. A statutory deadline, such as the one that required an NRC decision within three
years, is one way to tailor the discretion of an agency.
111
5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012).
112
Id. § 701(a)(2).
113
508 U.S. 182 (1993).
114
Id. at 193.
115
Id. at 185–87.
116
Id. at 186–88.
117
Id. at 189.
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law.”
The seminal case on agency discretion is Heckler v. Chaney,119 which
addressed whether an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action is
committed to agency discretion by law.120 The Supreme Court reasoned
that deference to agency decisions is appropriate because: (1) agencies are
experts in their fields and judges are not in a position to balance the
competing demands for the limited resources at an agency’s disposal; (2)
when an agency fails to act, its decision generally does not threaten the
right of an individual deserving the protection of the courts; and (3) the
doctrine of separation of powers left the executive branch with
responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”121 In
Chaney, the Court held that an agency decision whether to enforce a
violation of a law is unreviewable by the courts under section 701(a)(2) of
the APA.122 Courts simply do not have the expertise to second-guess the
thousands of decisions made each day by government agencies.
The Supreme Court has not addressed when an agency’s delay
demands a writ of mandamus by the courts. The issue remains marked by
inconsistencies in the courts, and scholars have noted that academia has
also failed to provide helpful guidance.123 The factors considered by the
Court in Chaney regarding agency inaction parallel factors considered by
courts looking at agency delay. Whereas Chaney is well-established
Supreme Court doctrine uniformly followed by lower courts, the principle
of agency deference should guide courts when considering charges of
agency delay.
Professor Richard Pierce argues that the judiciary has responsibility to
take an active role in crafting remedies that address agency delay in the
face of inadequate resources.124 He predicted in 1997 that agencies would
forever have constantly diminishing resources to comply with statutory
mandates because Congress faces myriad political demands that call for
spending cuts and the exercise of Congress’s power to set mandates.125
118

Id. at 193 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988)).
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
120
Id. at 826.
121
Id. at 831–32 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
122
Id. at 837.
123
See Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN L.
REV. 1, 4, 11 (2008) (arguing that judicial review of agency inaction and delay is “incoherent” because
the courts wrongfully treat agency action and inaction differently); Ridgway, supra note 3, at 94
(“Concrete guidance for judicial intervention is rare.”); Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays:
How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency FootDragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1388 (2011) (“The approach developed in the lower courts is
ad hoc, incoherent, and difficult to apply consistently.”).
124
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency
Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 90 (1997).
125
Id. at 64–66.
119
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Applying the principals from Chaney, Pierce favors more discretion for
agencies because courts are ill equipped to strike the balance among the
many statutory demands on agencies with their limited resources.126 Using
the 14,000 decisions with statutory deadlines made annually by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service as his example, Pierce points out
the reality that a good majority of agency decisions do not come before
federal courts when a deadline is missed.127 Pierce would give agencies
the discretion to delay, except in circumstances where Congress specifies a
He believes statutory deadlines demonstrate
statutory deadline.128
Congress’s intent and its rejection of the idea that a lack of agency
resources is a reasonable excuse to delay.129
Professor Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio contends that agency delay is an
unavoidable cost of the administrative state, and that Congress and the
Executive are better equipped than the courts to address the issue.130
Nonetheless, Sant’Ambrogio concludes that all three branches of the
government have a responsibility to address agency delay, and that courts
should make a contribution by using a cost-benefit analysis.131 Anchoring
his conclusions in the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA,132 he argues that any delay in agency rulemaking must be grounded
in the substantive law and not other policy considerations, no matter how
practical the policy may be.133 So long as the delay to the rulemaking is
supportive of the underlying objectives of the law, deference should be
given to the agency.
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA argued that it should be permitted to
delay its determination whether the Clean Air Act requires regulation of
greenhouse gasses because the executive branch initiated voluntary
programs to address global warming and further action under the Act
would impair international negotiations to reduce emissions.134 The Court
refused to consider these policy considerations unaddressed by the Act and
held that the EPA had a duty under the Act to determine whether
greenhouse gas emissions harmed the public health and welfare.135
Looking at Massachusetts v. EPA as well, Andrew Schwentker argues
that an agency has unfettered discretion to delay rulemaking indefinitely if
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Id. at 92–93.
Id. at 85.
128
Id. at 93.
129
Id.
130
Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 123, at 1430–32.
131
Id. at 1435–36.
132
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
133
Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 123, at 1436.
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549 U.S. at 533.
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Id. at 534–35.
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it determines it has inadequate resources.
In essence, such an argument
could have given the EPA a way to avoid the Court’s order to comply.
Schwentker’s argument is another option for agencies with pre-textual
motives, political or otherwise, that wish to delay statutory mandates. He
did not suggest such deference applies to statutory deadlines in an
adjudicatory process as is the case in In re Aiken County, but there are
similar factors in both scenarios.
To better appreciate the factors courts apply when considering whether
an agency’s action is unlawfully delayed, this Note looks beyond the
scholarly articles to federal cases. In 1976, the plaintiffs in Open
America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force137 sued the FBI when the
agency response rate to document requests was months behind the thirtyday deadline established by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).138
The FBI argued that it was doing the best it could with a backlog of 5,000
requests and no additional funding from Congress to manage the new
obligation imposed by the Act.139 When Congress passed FOIA it had
estimated that each agency would bear an additional $100,000 in workload
costs to meet the public demand for government documents.140 Instead of
appropriating additional funds for each agency, Congress intended that
agencies would use their general funding to respond to requests.141 The
demand on the FBI greatly exceeded those predictions, and the level of
requests cost $2,675,000 in the first year of FOIA’s implementation.142
The court’s decision was relatively lenient: given the FBI’s limited
resources, it was permitted to ignore its statutory deadline to the extent it
made a good faith effort to respond to FOIA requests in the order they
were received.143
In 1984, the D.C. Circuit articulated the “TRAC factors” in
Telecommunications Research & Action Center (TRAC) v. FCC.144 These
factors offer guidance on whether an agency’s delay is so egregious that a
court must issue a writ of mandamus. The plaintiffs in TRAC filed suit
against the FCC after the agency failed to rule on the validity of
overcharge fees assessed on AT&T customers more than four years after
the bills were paid.145 The Court formulated six factors that previous
136
R. Andrew Schwentker, Essay, Mandating Unfunded Mandates? Agency Discretion in
Rulemaking After Massachusetts v. EPA, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1444, 1447 (2008).
137
547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
138
Id. at 608.
139
Id. at 613.
140
Id. at 612.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 616. But see Pierce, supra note 124, at 93 (favoring considerable deference to agency
decisions, but not when Congress sets a statutory deadline).
144
750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
145
Id. at 72.

2013]

AN ALTERNATIVE TO IN RE AIKEN COUNTY

351

courts had applied and that are appropriate for review of an agency delay:
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be
governed by a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has
provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with
which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling
statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule
of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of
economic regulation are less tolerable when human health
and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the
effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a
higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take
into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced
by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety
lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency
action is unreasonably delayed.146
After laying out the comprehensive TRAC factors, the court reasoned that
the factors did not have to be applied to the case at hand because the FCC
assured the court that it would take proper remedial steps in the near
future.147 The court avoided what appeared to be a ripe opportunity to
provide a clear standard for later courts to determine when a writ of
mandamus is appropriate to address agency delays. However, had the
court applied the factors and found a writ of mandamus appropriate, a
judgment ordering the agency to act would not have been much harsher
than the remedy chosen by the court—continued oversight by the court and
mandatory updates by the FCC.148 This example shows that there can be
little to no difference between an agency’s response to a decision finding it
unlawfully delayed and a decision finding it acted within its authority.
In 1991, the D.C. Circuit applied the TRAC factors in In re Barr
Laboratories, Inc.149 when the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) failed
to review a new drug application within a statutory deadline.150 The court
held that mandamus was not appropriate because compelling the agency to
act would “impose offsetting burdens on equally worthy generic drug
producers, equally wronged by the agency’s delay.”151 The court, utilizing
TRAC’s fourth factor, held that unreasonable delay alone does not justify
judicial intervention, and that requiring the FDA to act on the plaintiff’s
application ahead of others would simply compromise the agency’s other
146

Id. at 80 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
148
Id. at 81.
149
930 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
150
Id. at 74.
151
Id. at 73.
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priorities.
Any benefit derived from expediting one application would
delay other equally worthy applications, and the court determined it had no
remedy available that would “advance either fairness or Congress’s policy
objective.”153 Had the court ordered the FDA to act immediately on the
plaintiff’s application, it would have been doing no more than prioritizing
the agency’s resources—and if every applicant with a legitimate claim
against the FDA’s failure to meet its statutory deadline had filed suit, the
court would have no remedy to provide.
In Forest Guardians v. Babbitt (Forest Guardians II),154 however, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit declined to follow In
re Barr Laboratories and did not apply the TRAC factors when the
Department of the Interior missed a clear statutory deadline.155 The APA
stated that a “reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed.”156 The Tenth Circuit understood
“unreasonably delayed” to mean that a court generally has discretion to
determine when agency delay is unreasonable.157 Ultimately, however, the
court held that when an agency fails to meet a congressionally imposed
deadline, a court-ordered writ of mandamus is always appropriate and
necessary because agency action was “unlawfully withheld” under the
APA.158 Thus, in Forest Guardians, the Tenth Circuit held that mandamus
was appropriate to compel the Secretary of the Interior to designate the
critical habitat boundaries of the silvery minnow when the Secretary had
exceeded the allotted time.159 Both In re Barr Laboratories and Forest
Guardians were decided over ten years ago, and the Supreme Court has
not addressed the split between the D.C. and Tenth Circuit.
While the Tenth Circuit has adopted a black-line rule for determining
when mandamus is necessary, the application of the rule in Forest
Guardians led the parties to a result similar to the more lenient rule
adopted by the D.C. Circuit in In re Barr Laboratories. After remanding
the case and directing the lower court to “consider what work is necessary
to complete the [habitat] designation,”160 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged
its powers were insufficient.161 Although the deadline had passed two
152

Id. at 75.
Id. at 76.
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174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Id. at 1191.
156
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1994).
157
Forest Guardians II, 174 F.3d at 1190.
158
Id. at 1191.
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Id. at 1193.
160
Forest Guardians v. Babbitt (Forest Guardians I), 164 F.3d 1261, 1274 (10th Cir. 1998),
amended by 174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999).
161
See Forest Guardians II, 174 F.3d at 1180 (amending its original decision and holding that
“any order now to impose a new deadline for compliance must consider what work is necessary to
publish the final rule and how quickly that can be accomplished”).
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years prior, and mandamus was ruled appropriate, the court was at a loss
for what it could realistically expect to demand from the agency. When
agency inaction is the result of inadequate resources, courts acknowledge
that they lack the expertise to balance the competing demands of the
agency,162 and risk reorganizing the agency’s priorities to the detriment of
another party.163
C. Agency Inaction in the Face of Limited Resources
Agency delay may be caused by various impediments such as
congressional politics, presidential priorities, agency capture,
incompetency, unforeseen circumstances, or simply limited resources. It is
this last cause of delay that the NRC argued prevents it from reviewing the
DOE application.164 The NRC contended that TRAC cannot be applied to
determine whether mandamus is appropriate because the agency cannot be
faulted for inaction for something that is “impossible” to accomplish given
the absence of congressional appropriations.165 It argued that the threeyear statutory deadline to make a determination on the DOE application for
a permanent repository was “tolled” by Congress, which chose not to
appropriate adequate resources to complete the review.166
Further, the NRC argued it cannot conduct an adequate review without
the DOE actively litigating and defending its application before the
ASLB.167 As the applicant, the DOE must defend the more than 288
outstanding contentions by interveners, and Congress has refused to
appropriate funding to the DOE for such purposes just as it has withheld
funding from the NRC.168
With more than $28 billion sitting in the Waste Fund, one might think
the NRC does not have a shortage of resources. If a writ of mandamus is
an equitable solution, then perhaps a court should order the NRC to use the
Waste Fund or use general appropriations. Unfortunately for the
petitioners, these solutions run afoul of the Constitution and the NWPA.
The NWPA states the repository should not be built with taxpayer
dollars, but with fees levied on the entities whose nuclear waste will be
162
See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[A]n agency decision not to enforce
often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its
expertise.”).
163
See, e.g., Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(describing TRAC’s fifth factor).
164
Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 39.
165
Id. at 56–57.
166
Id. at 57. As used in this Note, to toll something means “to stop the running of [it],” and is
used to reference the suspension of a statute’s time requirements. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1625
(9th ed. 2009).
167
Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 27.
168
See supra text accompanying notes 84–89.
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stored.
The Waste Fund, established by section 302(c) of the NWPA, is
paid into by producers of nuclear waste and may only be used to dispose
nuclear waste, or matters associated with a permanent solution.170 To date,
the NRC has used the Waste Fund only when Congress has appropriated
funds from it. Restricting itself from using general funds is consistent with
appropriations law established by Congress and clarified by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the Principles of Federal
Appropriations.171 This highly respected guidance states that an agency
may not use a general appropriation where Congress has made a specific
appropriation for a program, unless the specific appropriation has been
exhausted and the legislation stipulates that the general appropriation may
be used at such time.172 Article I of the Constitution entrusts Congress to
appropriate money from the Treasury,173 which administers the Waste
Fund.174 Simply put, the judicial authority to issue a writ of mandamus is
not extensive enough to order the NRC, Treasury, or Congress to use the
Waste Fund for the sole purpose for which it was created.175
Even if the NRC could use general appropriations, it is not possible to
know what ramifications it would have on the NRC’s other priorities.
Courts have been reluctant to decide how an agency should spend its
resources on a given mandate.176 Using general appropriations to review
the DOE application would sacrifice other statutory priorities of the NRC,
169

42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(7) (2006).
Id. § 10222(c), (d); see also 128 CONG. REC. 32,554, 32,556–67 (1982) (floor comments by
Senator James McClure, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources); 128
CONG. REC. 26,306, 26,308 (1982) (summary of the Act entered into the record by Congressman
Morris Udall, Chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs).
171
See 1 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-2615P, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 2-21 to 2-23 (3d ed. 2004) (“The Red Book”). Congress has tasked the GAO
with guiding federal agencies on matters of appropriations law. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3528–3529
(authorizing the GAO to relieve from liability a government official authorized to spend money of the
United States if the official wrongfully spent funds but did so in good faith, and instructing the GAO to
respond to certified officials when they pose questions regarding how the agency’s funds may be
spent). To fulfill this responsibility the GAO publishes the Red Book, a comprehensive three-volume
guide on appropriations law that federal agencies consult on a daily basis when they have questions
regarding how much appropriations money they can spend and for what purposes. If an agency seeks
more assurance, it may petition the GAO for a decision on the matter. Id. § 3529. The Red Book and
GAO decisions provide guidance and a healthy precedent for most inquiries, but they do not provide
guidance for all possible scenarios, e.g., whether the remaining $11.1 million at the NRC’s disposal
must be spent down.
172
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 171, at 2-21.
173
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
174
42 U.S.C. § 10222(c).
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For other examples when courts are limited in their ability to force the hand of government,
see supra, notes 105 and accompanying text.
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In using TRAC factors, the court avoided making decisions for agencies that were better
positioned to prioritize their responsibilities with available resources. See Telecomms. Research &
Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (outlining the fourth factor).
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and would not remedy the DOE’s inability to be an active participant.
Some courts and scholars have taken the position that a statutory
deadline represents the clear intent of Congress, and that section 706(1) of
the APA demands that courts compel agencies to comply regardless of
resource constraints. The Tenth Circuit took this position in Forest
Guardians, as discussed above.177 Professor Eric Biber highlights resource
allocation as a consistent and principal factor in opinions by courts
reviewing agency decisions.178 Biber believes an agency without adequate
resources should be permitted to delay a statutory mandate indefinitely if
resources are not provided—but he makes a similar exception as the Tenth
Circuit, and would compel an agency to act if it is in violation of a
statutory deadline.179 He joins the general consensus that courts must
compel agencies with statutory deadlines to act regardless of inadequate
resources.180
Despite the reasoned arguments that courts must compel agencies to
act when they miss their statutory deadlines, should the deadline stand
without question when Congress has intentionally underfunded the
program? Is there no basis in law that a deadline set by Congress is not
absolute in the face of inadequate funding? When courts are tasked with
reconciling conflicting legislation, such as the NWPA against recent
appropriations bills, they question Congress’s rationale. However, the
precarious situation of underfunding a repository in Nevada does not stem
from a single, rational, comprehensive plan. It is the product of competing
interests within Congresses from the past and present. There are
competing goals scattered amongst the 535 elected representatives, and
courts have the task of deciphering what Congress as an institution
intended.181 It becomes trickier when the competing goals of individual
members result in legislation that is non-representative of any one member
but the married outcome of many.
The remainder of Part III.C will review federal cases that address
whether an agency must follow the strict reading of a statute when
underfunding, impossibility, absurd results, and congressional intent does
not favor a strict application of the law. In 1931, the Supreme Court
reasoned that “[a] literal application of a statute which would lead to
absurd consequences is to be avoided whenever a reasonable application
177

Forest Guardians II, 174 F.3d 1178, 1191 (10th Cir. 1999).
Biber, supra note 123, at 26–27.
179
Id. at 49.
180
But see In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that delay beyond a
statutory mandate is not unreasonable where compelling an agency to process a plaintiff’s application
would be detrimental to others with applications pending before the agency).
181
For a discussion on the difficulty posed when determining the intent of a Congress, see
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845,
864–65 (1992) (defending use of legislative intent by the courts).
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can be given which is consistent with the legislative purpose.”182 The
Court held that although a provision in the National Prohibition Act
permitted the government to seize all items found in a building used to
manufacture intoxicating liquor, the government could only seize those
items used or belonging to the defendant charged with violating the Act.183
To permit the government to seize items belonging to third parties would
create the “absurd consequence[]” of a “penalt[y] having no relation to the
offense.”184
There are times when a court should permit an agency to ignore a strict
adherence of the law resulting in an absurd result due to a lack of agency
resources. The D.C. Circuit applied this rationale in Open America when it
held that an agency without adequate resources has discretion to miss a
statutory deadline if the agency is making a good faith effort to comply.185
In some circumstances, it is clear that an “absurd” result created by a
statute must be followed. In a decision limiting the power of courts to
dismiss a statute, the Supreme Court held in Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) v. Hill186 that the government could not close the gates on a
completed $100 million dam because it would destroy the habitat of an
endangered minnow.187 Destruction of the habitat was prohibited under the
Endangered Species Act,188 which preceded appropriations to build the
dam. The trial court held that the government could close the dam, noting
Congress was fully aware of the habitat’s imminent destruction when it
appropriated the funds, and that “[a]t some point in time a federal project
becomes so near completion and so incapable of modification that a court
of equity should not apply a statute enacted long after inception of the
project to produce an unreasonable result.”189
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and upheld the “cardinal
rule” that authorizing legislation can only be repealed by subsequent
legislation that directly repeals the prior law, and this is only more true for
an implied repeal found in an appropriation bill.190 Further, the Court
avoided making any judgment on the reasonableness of the Act that forced
182

United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175 (1931) (emphasis added).
Id. at 175–76.
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Id. at 175.
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Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(vacating an order that would have required the FBI to respond to a FOIA request within thirty days
when the agency had no new resources to manage a case load demanding $2.7 million in resources and
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437 U.S. 153 (1978), superseded by statute, Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 5, 92 Stat. 3751, 3761. For a discussion on the part of the decision that remains
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187
437 U.S. at 174.
188
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abandonment of $100 million spent on a dam, since the underlying law
was “abundantly clear that the balance ha[d] been struck in favor of
affording endangered species the highest of priorities.”191
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also heard
a case about a partially completed dam in County of Vernon v. United
States.192 The court held that the Army Corps of Engineers did not violate
the statute when it stopped construction of a dam with funds remaining
because Congress had gone fourteen years without appropriating the
requisite funds to complete the job.193 The Army Corps had acquired
several thousand acres and undertaken construction from 1971 to 1975, at
which time the Governor and the state’s congressional representatives had
withdrawn their support.194 Congress ceased all funding by 1977 and the
court was not asked to rule until 1991.195
The facts are analogous to In re Aiken County, although the Seventh
Circuit could say with more certainty that after fourteen years of no
appropriations for the dam, Washington would continue to not provide
additional funds. It is easy to agree that a writ of mandamus ordering the
Army Corps to spend down all of its remaining funds would have been
absurd. It is somewhat harder to argue that the writ of mandamus ordering
the NRC to do the same is absurd given that the Yucca project is only on
its third year of zero funding, nuclear waste is a problem that will not go
away, and proponents of Yucca remain in Congress.
Not only does Congress appropriate inadequate funds, but at times it
proactively prohibits the use of any funds for a statutory mandate. Just
months after the Secretary of Interior exceeded the Endangered Species
Act deadline for declaring the habitat boundaries of the red-legged frog,
Congress precluded expenditure of FY 1995 funds for such activities.196
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in
Environmental Defense Center v. Babbitt197 that if an appropriation bill
191
Id. at 194. In direct response to the Court’s decision, Congress passed section 5 of the
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, which inserted an exemption into the Act allowing the
Tellico Dam to close and flood the endangered minnow’s habitat. So while TVA v. Hill was technically
superseded, it is still cited as good law for its principles: requiring courts to uphold troublesome aspects
of legislation when the intent of Congress was clear, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)
(“Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial
process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of
veto.” (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 194–95)), and that an authorizing statute cannot be modified or
amended by an appropriations statute, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S.
644, 670 (2007) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 189 n.35).
192
933 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1991).
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Id. at 535.
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Id. at 533.
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prohibits use of the funds from carrying out a particular mandate, then a
writ of mandamus is not appropriate because it is impossible for the agency
to comply with the statute.198 The Ninth Circuit dictated that the statutory
mandate was not repealed, but there was no duty to act until funds were
made available.199
IV. ADOPTING A NEW RULE
A. Challenge for the Courts
After waiting a year to see if Congress would address the inconsistency
between what the law mandated and the reality of appropriated funds, the
D.C. Circuit ordered the NRC to spend the remaining $11.1 million to
review the DOE application for Yucca.200 Essentially, the court held that
after a reasonable amount of patience, it is always appropriate to order an
agency to use remaining funds to move forward with a statutory
mandate.201 Although the court acknowledged that the $11.1 million
would be wasted if Congress did not take action to fund the review
process, the court reasoned that it had “no good choice but to grant the
petition for a writ of mandamus.”202 But there was a better choice.
The court’s main argument was that continual defiance of a statutory
mandate violated Congress’s constitutional authority to pass laws that the
Executive must obey.203 The court simplified the facts to fit them within
the constitutional principle requiring the Executive to “follow statutory
mandates so long as there is appropriated money available.”204 It is not a
fair analysis of the facts to assert that appropriated money is available to
review the license for a repository at Yucca Mountain when spending it
would not increase the speed or likelihood of achieving the policy
objectives of the NWPA. While an agency cannot ignore a mandate
simply because Congress provided inadequate funding,205 the court should
permit the mandate to be tolled until funds are appropriated.206
But what is adequate funding, and should the agency make that
determination? The court in In re Aiken County only addressed the latter
198

Id. at 869.
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200
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See id. at 259 (holding that three consecutive years of near zero appropriations for a statutory
mandate does not repeal the mandate).
206
See id. at 268 (Garland, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing that the NRC has not refused to proceed
with the mandate receiving zero appropriations for three consecutive years, only that the agency has
suspended the process until there are sufficient funds to make meaningful progress).
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question and rejected more discretion at the helm of agencies, under the
concern it would shift power from Congress to the Executive.207 Further, if
mandates can be tolled due to inadequate appropriations, how can courts be
assured that an agency is not abusing that discretion to toll laws it
disfavors?
B. The Proposed Rule
This Note proposes that a writ of mandamus ordering an agency to act
is not appropriate when there is near certainty the action will not expedite
relief for the claimant due to a lack of future appropriations. As was the
court’s conclusion in TRAC, the decision whether to allow an agency to
violate a statute is not an easy one.208 But drawing on the discussion in
Part III, courts would be wise to consider the following factors:
(1) whether general appropriated funds may be used to fulfill
the statutory duty;
(2) whether Congress is unlikely to appropriate sufficient
funds in the future that would render spending the remaining
funds beneficial to fulfilling the statutory mandate;
(3) whether starting and stopping actions to address the
statutory mandate creates added costs; and
(4) whether mandamus would negatively implicate the
agency’s other statutory duties.
Each of these factors should be applied with the flexibility necessary to
successfully exercise the equitable authority of courts.209
Factor 1: Whether general appropriated funds may be used to
fulfill the statutory duty.
If general appropriated funds may be used to fulfill a duty by a
statutory mandate, then an agency should be ordered to draw on such funds
in a manner that does not have negative implications—such as those
discussed below in Factor 4. If an agency has full discretion to use its
general appropriations to fulfill the mandate then courts must appropriately
balance this ability with the other factors. The agencies in In re Barr
Laboratories, Environmental Defense Center, and Forest Guardians all
had limitations on some set of funding. In a comparable manner, the NRC
207

Id. at 259 (majority opinion).
See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Although
the standard is hardly ironclad, and sometimes suffers from vagueness, it nevertheless provides useful
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was prohibited from using its general appropriations.
Factor 2: Whether Congress is unlikely to appropriate sufficient
funds in the future that would render spending the remaining funds
beneficial to fulfilling the statutory mandate.
Politics is unpredictable and given the sheer difficulty of passing
legislation that a majority of Congress supports, courts should not rely on
what Congress might do next. But at times, it is appropriate to predict
what Congress will not do. The Seventh Circuit correctly held that after
fourteen years of no additional funding, the Army Corps of Engineers
cannot be ordered to continue construction of a dam when “Congress has
not appropriated sufficient funds to complete the Project.”210 The proposed
rule states that if there is near certainty that Congress will not appropriate
additional funds for a mandated project that a court should weigh such
facts in its decision whether to compel agency action.
The possibility of future funding is necessary for the writ of mandamus
to have any chance at providing relief to the claimant. The petitioners in In
re Aiken County ultimately sought not just NRC’s review of the Yucca
application, or a repository in Nevada, but also the carting away of nuclear
waste from their respective locales. Absent the possibility of future
funding, a writ of mandamus ordering the NRC to act will not expedite the
remedy sought by the petitioners, and it would not be within the court’s
jurisdiction to issue such a writ.
Therefore, can the D.C. Circuit be near certain that Congress will not
appropriate adequate funding for the review of the DOE application after
making zero appropriations in the three previous years? This Note does
not imagine that predicting Congress’s inaction in the future will be easy.
Reliance on three years of congressional action to make a prediction is
materially different than reliance on fourteen years of no funding, as
considered by the Seventh Circuit in County of Vernon. However, it would
be foolish to think that the NRC will receive the necessary funding to make
measurable progress within the next four years when considering the
following relevant factors: the nuclear disaster at Fukushima Daiichi
motivated a new sense of congressional urgency to address nuclear
waste;211 the most recent Presidential budgets have all requested zero or
210

Cnty. of Vernon v. United States, 933 F.2d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1991).
The 2011 tsunami that hit the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan flooded the generators that
powered the water pumps replenishing the cooling pools.
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inadequate funding for the Yucca licensing process; the Majority Leader in
the Senate has blocked all attempts to provide even marginal funding for
the licensing process; and the expectation that Obama and Reid will
maintain the same policy prerogative during their time in office through
January 2017.
There is near certainty that Congress will not act before the NRC uses
the entire $11.1 million before making any permanent progress on the
review. Even if Senate Republicans win a majority in the 2014 election
and pass an appropriation bill that fully funds the licensing process and
there is a legislative vehicle that avoids a presidential veto, funding for the
application review would arrive at the NRC in the last months of 2015.212
Even under these most promising conditions for Yucca supporters, the
review process of Yucca Mountain will not receive another dollar for more
than two years.
Factor 3: Whether starting and stopping actions to address the
statutory mandate creates added costs.
Mandamus is an equitable remedy that considers “timing, resources,
and efficacy.”213 It cannot be assumed that spending money today will
move a process closer to completion, especially a federal agency that must
put projects on pause as it waits for additional funds. The Supreme Court
in Chaney recognized greater agency discretion because, inter alia,
agencies are the experts in the field and judges are inferior at balancing
competing priorities with limited resources.214 If a court finds an agency is
likely to spend all of a program’s funding before Congress appropriates
additional funds, then the court must ask whether ordering the agency to
act will result in a squandering of those funds. The substantive law might
be better addressed, and in quicker fashion, if those limited resources are
combined with future appropriations by Congress. The NRC argued that
starting and stopping a review process sacrifices the ability to retain
specialists, assemble the ASLB judges to hear contentions, furnish a
courtroom facility in Nevada, and pick up the litigation on contentions left
unresolved.215 An equitable solution with these circumstances does not
demand a writ of mandamus.

speed. Matthew L. Wald, A Safer Nuclear Crypt, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011, at B1. At a minimum,
policy leaders are favoring relocating spent fuel to consolidation storage to minimize the dangers of
natural disasters. See BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16.
212
The newly elected Congress will begin January 3, 2015, U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1, and be
responsible for the coming FY 2016 appropriations, beginning October 1, 2015, 2 U.S.C. § 631 (2012).
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In re Aiken Cnty., No. 11-1271, 2012 WL 3140360, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2012)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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Factor 4: Whether mandamus would negatively implicate the
agency’s other statutory duties.
Courts should not order agency action that grants relief for a party
before the court at the expense of other individuals with adjudicatory
matters before the agency. As was addressed in In re Barr Laboratories,
the D.C. Circuit held that a writ of mandamus ordering an agency to
review a claimant’s application was not appropriate when doing so would
delay the applications of other parties filed with the FDA.216 Congress set
a time limit on the review of generic drug applications, and had the court
ordered the agency to act on the plaintiff’s application, the order would
have frustrated the statute by further delaying other applications also
entitled to protection by the statute’s deadlines.217 In Open America, the
D.C. Circuit was correct not to interfere with the FBI’s management of its
FOIA response protocol even though it had a backlog of 5,000 requests
exceeding the statutory deadline.218 Factor 4 was not relevant to In re
Aiken County, where the NWPA required all appropriations from the
Waste Fund to be used for a nuclear repository and Yucca Mountain is the
only possible site.
One factor omitted from the proposed rule, but included in TRAC, is
whether missing a statutory deadline or agency delay is found to mask
impropriety by an agency.219 Such improper actions were not lost on Judge
Rudolph, who joined the opinion in In re Aiken County.220 If impropriety
were a factor, then surely the Administration’s and former Chairman
Jaczko’s actions do not favor more discretion for the Executive to
determine when inadequate funding permits tolling of a statutory mandate.
But the proposed rule is indifferent to whether the agency delayed
unfaithfully, focusing instead on preventing waste and avoiding absurd
results.
Even if former Chairman Jaczko had illegally undermined the NRC’s
ability to review the Yucca application, once Congress cut appropriations,
the Chairman’s policy agenda became representative of current
appropriations law. It is not a coincidence that opposition to Yucca at the
oversight agency occurred around the same time Congress undermined the
agency. When Congress is expected to defund an authorized project, even
an impartial head of an agency would have practical reasons to prepare for
the budget cuts if doing so preserves the integrity of the project. Although
216

In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (outlining
the sixth TRAC factor: “the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in
order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 267–68 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Randolph, J., concurring).
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Chairman Jaczko did everything to shut down the license review process
before Congress took legislative action, a Chairman favoring the review
process would take the same action if Congress was underfunding the
program. For these reasons, it is appropriate for the proposed rule to be
indifferent to impropriety when congressional appropriations preclude
progress towards the statutory mandate.
The proposed rule also does not account for the possibility that partial
review of the DOE application would provide relief to the claimant seeking
a writ of mandamus. Although this question was not before the court, it is
worthy to explain why not—given that the plaintiffs argued that partial
completion of the review process has utility.221 Along with members of
Congress, they argue that the NRC should respond to the court decision by
moving forward immediately with the Safety Evaluation Report (SER),222 a
NRC report that makes technical conclusions regarding whether the DOE
application is compliant with safety and security regulations.223
Their argument can feature one of two propositions. First, that
completion of the SER will prove Yucca meets all safety regulations—
undermining the argument of opponents and reigniting the political support
necessary to fund the project.224 This argument has no merit because
courts do not issue a writ of mandamus that provides relief in the form of
political victories that may or may not result in benefits outside the control
of the court.225
221
See, e.g., Petitioners’ Response to Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, In re Aiken
Cnty., 725 F.3d 255 (No. 11-1271) (“The SERs and the full licensing record, paid for by billions of
dollars of public funds, will inform all future repository efforts, regardless of whether Yucca Mountain
is ever built.”).
222
See Press Release, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong., In Wake of Court’s
Order, NRC and DOE Testify on Yucca Mountain License Review (Sept. 10, 2013), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/wake-court%E2%80%99s-order-nrc-and-doe-testifyyucca-mountain-license-review (pressuring the NRC to complete its SER of the DOE application, even
if the full review is not currently possible).
223
Implementing the Nuclear Waste Policy Act—Next Steps: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Env’t and the Econ. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of
Allison M. MacFarlane, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n). The SER was planned to be
reported in five volumes, and volume one was released in 2010 before the review process was put on
hold. Id.; see also 1 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT RELATED TO DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL
RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN A GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA, U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMM’N 1 (2009) (noting that the NRC documents the review process of a license
application in a SER).
224
See Petitioners’ Response to Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 221, at 9
(recognizing that the SERs “will inform all future repository efforts”).
225
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571 (1992) (holding that the complaint,
requesting that an Egyptian construction project receiving U.S. funds comply with the Endangered
Species Act, lacked redressability because the construction project could still be implemented, and the
habitat of an endangered species destroyed, when U.S. aid only accounted for 10% of the project’s
funding); Weber v. United States, 209 F.3d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that a writ of mandamus
is not appropriate to order an agency investigation that leads to a recommendation not binding on
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Second, proponents of Yucca may argue that the review process is a
step-by-step process, and every step completed reduces the amount of time
remaining to complete the entire review. However, it has not been shown
that $11.1 million is enough to complete the SER, and the premise that it
can be completed contradicts the finding by the court that no meaningful
progress could be conducted with just $11.1 million.226 Even if the SER
can be completed with the funds, it was never shown that doing so would
expedite the additional pieces of the NRC review necessary to approve the
application.227
C. What Should Be Made of Congressional Intent?
The Supreme Court has long held that courts need not apply a strict
reading of the law if such a reading yields an absurd result.228 At the same
time, the Court’s decision in TVA v. Hill holds that courts should not apply
the absurdity doctrine where Congress was aware of the law’s impact.229
So, if spending $11.1 million would prove completely wasteful, is it
possible Congress was not aware of the impact the NWPA and subsequent
appropriations would have on the overall plan? Through public pledges,
committee reports, and letters to agency officials, congressional leaders
have staked out their positions on Yucca; however, the recent
appropriation bills and corresponding conference reports offer no
explanation of what Congress intended when it provided zero funding for
FYs 2012 and 2013 for the NRC’s review of the application.230 The latest
appropriation bills reflect congressional intent to prevent any meaningful
review of the DOE application during the most recent fiscal years231—but
does it show that Congress was aware that $11.1 million of taxpayer
dollars would be squandered on a review process that is impossible to
anyone); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 (1984) (denying standing to plaintiff arguing that
a tax exemption unconstitutionally creates as segregated school system because, inter alia, it was
speculative whether the tax exemption caused the segregated schools).
226
See In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d at 267 (“[I]f Congress determines in the wake of our decision
that it will never fund the Commission’s licensing process to completion, we would certainly hope that
Congress would step in before the current $11.1 million is expended, so as to avoid wasting that
taxpayer money.” (emphasis added)); id. at 269–70 (Garland, C.J., dissenting) (“The Commission has
concluded that it cannot [make any meaningful progress with the remaining $11.1 million]. And we
are not in a position—nor do we have any basis—to second-guess that conclusion.” (citations
omitted)).
227
Most notably, the review process includes a lengthy litigation before the ASLB, where
interested parties may challenge the DOE application. See Fact Sheet on Licensing Yucca Mountain,
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fsyucca-license-review.html (last updated March 29, 2012).
228
See supra note 182.
229
437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
230
H.R. REP. NO. 112-331, at 855 (2011) (Conf. Rep.).
231
See supra Part II.E.
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finish?
It is possible that Congress expected some waste and inefficiency in
the review process when it zeroed out appropriations for Yucca. But that
action does not show intent; it shows a preference to waste an unknown
amount in favor of delaying Yucca. More importantly, a look at any
authorizing legislation, in this case the NWPA, would never show intent to
waste $11.1 million. By ordering the spending of $11.1 million, the D.C.
Circuit avoided an opportunity to apply the absurdity doctrine.
While there is no clear congressional intent that the NRC should spend
down the $11.1 million, it is also true that there is no clear intent that the
NRC should hold the funds and delay its review of the application. The
government erroneously argued that “Congress’s most recent funding
decisions demonstrate a legislative intent . . . that NRC should not conduct
its proceeding to review the application [at this time].”232 This reads too
much into congressional inaction and wrongfully suggests that if the NRC
moved forward with reviewing the Yucca application it would be in
violation of the appropriation bills when the agency is fully authorized to
move forward. TVA v. Hill still supports the cardinal rule that repealing an
authorizing legislation by mere implication is not favored, especially when
the implication is in an appropriations bill.233 There could be no judicial
review of a decision by the NRC to spend the $11.1 million, even if it was
found to be completely wasteful.234
On the other hand, a writ of mandamus ordering an agency to spend
down funds that produce no measurable benefit to the public can be
considered an absurd result that Congress never intended. Had the D.C.
Circuit held mandamus was not appropriate, the decision would have been
consistent with the absurdity doctrine and the holding in TVA v. Hill.
D. Responding to the D.C. Circuit
In its decision, the D.C. Circuit was concerned with a shift in
constitutional authority that would occur if agencies were given discretion
to toll statutory mandates due to inadequate resources.235 By ordering the
NRC to continue its review of the application for Yucca Mountain, the
court believed it was protecting Congress’s constitutional authority. It is
ironic that the leading cause of the shift was Congress itself. When the
232

Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 38.
See 437 U.S. at 174 (holding it is unlawful to close the gates on a $100 million completed dam
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“committed to agency discretion by law” (quoting the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
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Waste Fund has over $28 billion that can be used solely for a repository at
Yucca Mountain and Congress appropriates zero dollars, it is clear that
Congress’s intent was to block the completion of the repository. Refusing
to order the NRC to act would have provided relatively no disruption to the
NWPA as compared with the intentional defunding of the NWPA by the
same legislative body whose authority the D.C. Circuit asserts to be
protecting.
The D.C. Circuit also emphasized that an appropriation cannot amend
an authorization act, and it rightfully cited TVA v. Hill for that
proposition.236 But In re Aiken County can be distinguished from TVA v.
Hill for two reasons. First, in TVA v. Hill, the Act upheld by the court was
not dependent on the appropriation in conflict with it.237 In In re Aiken
County, the NWPA was threatened by a lack of appropriations and unlike
TVA v. Hill, the D.C. Circuit was not forced to pick one over the other.
Rather, the challenge to the D.C. Circuit was how to salvage the NWPA
despite the lack of appropriations. Its decision did nothing to further the
policy objectives of the NWPA because the $11.1 million is near certain to
be squandered due to a lack of future appropriations.
Second,
congressional intent is not as clear. The NWPA addresses what is
expected of the NRC when it has inadequate funds, as compared with the
Endangered Species Act, which is understood to protect the habitats of
endangered species at all costs.
E. Benefits of the Proposed Rule
In addition to providing a more equitable remedy for agencies caught
between statutory deadlines and inadequate appropriations, the proposed
rule will have societal benefits. Unfunded and underfunded authorizations
create inefficiencies that waste taxpayers’ dollars.238 The Congresses that
underfund projects in the name of fiscal responsibility ironically create
these situations. When an agency misses a deadline, it is accused of
inefficiency and incompetency by critics and elected officials, when in
truth Congress deserves to share in the blame for giving the agency a
mandate that is impossible to complete without available funds.
Instead of forcing agencies to rush projects and underperform, a court
decision confirming the impossibility of a statutory mandate will
appropriately cast responsibility back on Congress.239 A member of
236
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Congress wishing to implement a new education program, fix bridges,
establish historic landmarks, or any other project within their constituents’
list of priorities has an easier path to get the program authorized than they
do to get it funded.240 For one, elected officials are inclined to vote for
their colleagues’ projects that do not impact the budget. Second, the public
often fails to appreciate that an authorization is an empty gesture until it
receives funding. It is insincere for politicians to highlight the passage of
new initiatives, and then fail to secure the necessary funding to see the
projects through. Elected officials need to be held accountable for
supporting authorization bills, and campaigning on the passage of new
policy, but then failing to provide adequate funding.
V. CONCLUSION
The appropriations process is undermining the ability of federal
agencies to meet the mandates set by Congress. This can be especially true
of projects spanning multiple years or those with statutory deadlines. A
writ of mandamus is not appropriate if it would force an agency to spend
taxpayer dollars in a manner that would not increase the likelihood of
fulfilling the statute’s policy objective. Past court decisions confirm that
mandamus is not necessary in every case where a statutory mandate has
been violated or ignored by an agency. A review of circuit court decisions
shows that agencies should be given discretion to toll a statutory mandate
when they have inadequate resources.
There is a near certainty that the NRC’s review of the Yucca licensing
application will not be funded in the near future. It is also questionable
whether in the long-term Congress will fund, and the NRC will approve, a
repository at Yucca Mountain. Spending $11.1 million to review the
Yucca application will prove to be a useless, unintended consequence of
legislation that provides no relief for the claimants in In re Aiken County.
Future courts should recognize that neither the Constitution nor any
jurisprudence on judicial review of an agency action requires a similar
decision.

the authorizing statute, in order to hold elected officials responsible for intentionally authorizing
programs that they will not fund).
240
See Biber, supra note 123, at 46 (arguing that elected officials score easy political points by
passing authorizing legislation that addresses an issue, but that little attention is given to whether
Congress follows up with an adequate appropriation).

